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AFRICA AND NAMIBIA 
BPS van Eck٭ 
 
1 Introduction 
 
Role-players in the South African labour fraternity over the past number of months 
have been involved in a robust debate regarding the regulation of "temporary 
employment services"1 (for ease of reference "labour brokers"). Labour broking is 
currently allowed, and regulated in a limited sense, by the Labour Relations Act.2 
However, the labour broker industry is currently under scrutiny and awaiting 
legislative reform.  In October 2009, the social partners engaged in negotiations 
about this issue at the National Economic Development Labour Council (NEDLAC) 
and, as could be expected, were unable to reach consensus on future reforms.3 The 
most important trade union federations, namely the Congress of South African Trade 
Unions (Cosatu) and the National Council of Trade Unions (Nactu), confirmed that 
they are in favour of a legislative ban on labour broking.4 On the other hand, 
organised business and the Federation of Unions of South Africa (Fedusa) argued in 
favour of the retention of the existing system in South Africa, but accepted that there 
is a need for improved regulation.5 At the time of writing of this contribution, it was 
uncertain as to which direction legislative reforms will take. 
 
Since the implementation of amendments to the Namibian Labour Act (NLA)6 in 
2007, attempts have been made to ban 'labour hire' in Namibia.  However, in Africa 
Personnel Services (Pty) Ltd v Government of the Republic of Namibia7, the 
                                                 
٭ Stefan van Eck BLC LLB LLD (Pret).  Professor of Labour Law, University of Pretoria. 
1 See S 198(1) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (hereafter the LRA).  This concept has been 
termed in various manners in various contexts.  The International Labour Organisation's (ILO) 
Private Employment Agencies Convention 181 of 1997 refers to it as "private employment 
agencies" and in Namibia the expression "labour hire" is used. 
2 S 198(1)–(8) LRA. 
3 Backer Rapport 2. 
4 Craven 2009 www.cosatu.org.za.  Note that Fedusa called for a combination of regulation and 
enforcement of labour broking.  It can be speculated that Fedusa recognises the need for 
flexibility in the modern world of work, but that the maintenance of decent work should not be 
undermined by unscrupulous labour brokers.  See SAPA 2009 www.iol.co.za. 
5 NEDLAC "Report on Atypical Forms of Employment in South Africa and Labour Broking" 3. 
6 11 of 2007. 
7  SA 51/2008 2009 NASC 17(hereafter Africa Personnel Services). 
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Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) of Namibia recently held that a blanket prohibition 
on labour broking is unconstitutional under their legal framework.  The purpose of 
this discussion is to compare the situations in South Africa and Namibia and to 
determine whether South African policymakers can learn any lessons in the run-up 
to the finalisation of amendments to the LRA.  Section 2 of the contribution will cover 
the current position regarding labour broking in South Africa; Section 3 will explore 
the regulation of labour hire in Namibia; Section 4 will deal with some of the debates 
before NEDLAC; and the final section will present a number of conclusions and 
predictions.  
 
2 The position in South Africa 
 
Over the past two decades, business owners in South Africa have increasingly 
sought to 'externalise' the traditional full-time, permanent, employer-employee 
relationship into a triangular labour broker connection.8 This occurs when labour 
brokers make workers available to third-party clients that assign their duties and 
supervise the execution of their work. Most often the labour broker enters into a 
contract of employment with the worker, administers the payroll of persons who have 
been placed with clients and assumes the responsibilities of deducting employee's 
tax from the worker's salary.  The contract of employment is often made subject to 
the condition that the agreement continues for as long as the client requires the 
services of the employee.9 The labour broker concludes a commercial agreement 
with the client in terms of which the client is invoiced for the services being rendered, 
the labour broker pays the worker's wages and there is no contractual relationship 
between the client and the worker.  
 
Section 198(1) of the LRA10 provides certainty about the identity of the employer 
within this triangular relationship and delineates some of the responsibilities of the 
labour broker and the client. A "temporary employment service" is defined as: 
 
                                                 
8 Theron 2003 ILJ 1271. See also Theron 2005 ILJ 618; Theron 2008 ILJ 1.  
9  Theron (n 8) 2008 14. 
10  See also S 82 Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997 (hereafter BCEA). 
 BPS VAN ECK                       PER / PELJ  2010(13)2 
 
109/204 
 
any person who, for reward, procures for or provides to a client other 
persons- 
(a) who render services to, or perform work for, the client; and 
(b) who are remunerated by the temporary employment service. 
 
This section continues to establish a legal fiction by making the labour broker the 
employer of the person whose services have so been acquired, and the worker is 
identified as the employee of the labour broker.11 This construction prevails despite 
the fact that the employee generally renders services under the supervision and 
control of the client, is provided with tools of the trade and forms part of the client's 
organisation.12 
 
It does not follow that the client is relieved of all employer-employee 
responsibilities.13 The LRA stipulates that the labour broker (the deemed employer) 
and the client are jointly and severally liable in respect of contraventions of 
conditions of service arising from collective agreements concluded at bargaining 
councils, the minimum and maximum standards as set in the BCEA, and arbitration 
awards that regulate terms and conditions of service.14 In what appears to be a 
glaring omission, the section does not extend shared responsibility of some of the 
most significant protections offered by the LRA, such as protection against unfair 
dismissal and unfair labour practices perpetrated by the client against its workers.15  
 
                                                 
11  S 198(2) LRA. S 83(1) of the BCEA provides that the Minister of Labour may, on advice of the 
Employment Conditions Commission, issue a notice in the Government Gazette that deems any 
category of persons specified in the notice to be employees.  It is submitted that this may occur 
in cases in which there is uncertainty regarding the identity of persons who have been placed as 
independent contractors, who are excluded from the BCEA. This would extend protection in 
respect of employee rights to vulnerable employees.   
12  S 200A of the LRA establishes a presumption to the effect that a person who works under the 
supervision and control of another person is provided with tools of the trade and forms part of the 
other person's organisation is an employee of that person.  This is also in accordance with 
common-law tests developed by the courts.  See in this regard Smit v Workmen's Compensation 
Commissioner 1979 1 SA 51 (A) and South African Broadcasting Corporation v McKenzie 1999 
ILJ 585 (LAC). 
13  In Van Niekerk et al Law@work 72, it is mentioned that: 
[p]eculiar as it may seem, both the TES and the client were jointly and severally liable for 
unfair dismissals in terms of s 1(3)(d) of the 1956 LRA.  In one of the drafts of the LRA, 
provision was also made for the inclusion of such joint liability in terms of the new act.  
However, for reasons unknown, this was not included in the final version of the LRA. 
14  S 198(4) LRA. 
15  This has been confirmed on a number of occasions.  See, for example, April v Workforce Group 
Holdings (Pty) Ltd t/a The Workforce Group 2005 ILJ 2224 (CCMA) and National Union of 
Metalworkers of SA v SA Five Engineering (Pty) Ltd 2007 ILJ 1290 (LC). 
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Despite the mentioned omission, note that there are important provisions regarding 
joint and several liability contained in the Employment Equity Act.16 Should a labour 
broker commit an act of discrimination against an employee on the implied or 
expressed instructions of a client, both the labour broker and client will be jointly and 
severally liable.17 This could, for example, occur when a client instructs a labour 
broker only to provide persons who belong to a particular race group, follow a 
particular religion or who are not married or pregnant.18 This, I submit, does not 
extend to the unequal treatment between permanent employees of a client and those 
persons placed by a labour broker when it comes to equal pay for similar work and 
other conditions of service. Chapter II of the EEA was designed to protect workers 
against unfair discrimination in any employment policy or practice based on arbitrary 
grounds such as race, sex, gender and so forth but not in respect of unequal 
conditions of service.19 This was left to the devices of the BCEA and the LRA. 
 
To return to the LRA, in as far as the person so placed is not deemed to be a worker 
of the client but rather of the labour broker, the Commission for Conciliation, 
Mediation and Arbitration and the Labour Court do not have jurisdiction to consider 
disputes in respect of unfair dismissal and unfair labour practice disputes between 
the client and the worker.20 In addition, the contract between the labour broker and 
the worker is often made subject to the continuation of the commercial contract 
between the labour broker and the client. In instances in which this has been 
explicitly agreed upon, the courts have confirmed that the termination of the contract 
of employment on grounds that the client has terminated the commercial contract 
with the labour broker does not constitute dismissal at all.21 The effect of this is that if 
                                                 
16  55 of 1988 (hereafter EEA). 
17  S 57(2) EEA. 
18  S 6(1) of the EEA stipulates that no employer may unfairly discriminate, directly or indirectly, on a 
number of grounds including "race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, family responsibility, 
ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, HIV status, conscience, 
belief, political opinion, culture, language and birth". 
19  Note that in terms of S 10(1) of the EEA disputes in respect of unfair dismissal and unfair labour 
practices, which have discriminatory elements, must still be adjudicated in terms of the LRA. In 
terms of the last-mentioned  
Act, employees placed by labour brokers are not deemed to be employees of the client.  
20  Mandla v LAD Brokers (Pty) Ltd 2000 BLLR 1047 (LC); Vilane v SITA (Pty) Ltd 2008 BALR 486 
(CCMA).  
21  Mavata v Afrox Home Health Care 1998 ILJ 931 (CCMA); Hattingh v AMT Placement Services 
(Pty) Ltd 2005 BALR 595 (MEIBC).  See also the discussion of April v Workforce Group Holdings 
(Pty) Ltd t/a The Workforce Group 2005 ILJ 2224 (CCMA) by Bosch 2008 ILJ 831.  In Sindane v 
Prestige Cleaning Services 2009 BLLR 1249 (LC), the Labour Court recently confirmed that the 
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the termination does not constitute dismissal, a dispute about an unfair dismissal 
cannot be referred to the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration and 
the employee is left without remedy even though the circumstances may be grossly 
unfair. 
 
In addition, employees placed by labour brokers are at a disadvantage when it 
comes to bargaining about their wages and other conditions of service. As pointed 
out by Theron,22 the client remains the dominant party in the bargaining process 
between labour brokers and the receivers of the services. If, for example, a steel mill 
(the client) is in need of cleaning services, the client will factor a specific amount into 
its budget for this part of the undertaking's expenses. Should one labour broker not 
be able to meet the amount that has been budgeted for, the client merely looks for 
another labour broker in the cleaning services industry. In this manner, the client 
compares what different labour brokers in the cleaning industry can offer and 
accepts the offer of the lowest bidder. In this example, employees and their trade 
unions do not form part of any collective bargaining process when it comes to the 
determination of the commercial agreement between the dominant client and the 
provider of the services (the labour broker). The result is that employees placed by 
labour brokers do not receive the same wages and other conditions of service as the 
employees who are permanently appointed by the same client. This phenomenon 
prompted Theron23 to question whether there is a sound basis for the existence of 
these triangular relationships, which in essence remain a fiction. 
 
Neither the LRA nor the BCEA currently provides for the registration, certification or 
further regulation of private or public temporary employment services.  Although 
there are national forums at which collective bargaining takes place on conditions of 
service in, for example, the cleaning and security services industry, these national 
bargaining forums do not synchronise well with the granting of organisational rights 
(and other conditions of service) that are accorded to trade unions at particular 
workplaces.24 Thus, for example, the labour broker who provides services in the 
                                                                                                                                                        
termination of a commercial agreement between a labour broker and a client that resulted in the 
coming to an end of a worker's contract did not constitute dismissal. 
22  (n 8) 2008 13–14. 
23  (n 8) 2008 15. 
24  (n 8) 2008 14–15. 
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cleaning industry at a national level may not always be involved in the same sector 
of commerce as the client (such as the steel mill) in which the services are 
rendered.25 Against this background, it has been widely accepted in the South 
African context that employees in this industry do not receive the same protection as 
employees who are appointed in terms of a traditional full-time contract of 
employment by the client.26 
 
South Africa is a member of the ILO and the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa27 directs that international law "must", and foreign law "may" be considered 
when the Bill of Rights is interpreted.28 The issue of labour broking was recently 
considered by the Namibian courts and ILO principles were taken into account. 
Although South African courts are not bound by decisions of foreign jurisdictions, I 
suggest that South African policymakers may gain valuable insights into the 
arguments that may, in all probability, be raised in the South African context, should 
it be decided to place an outright prohibition on labour broking. 
 
3 The position in Namibia 
 
Intense debates preceded the regulation of labour hire in the Namibian National 
Assembly during 2007.29 Images of an inhumane labour broking system that was 
entrenched through apartheid policies are still fresh in Namibians' memories and it 
                                                 
25  In all fairness, it should be mentioned that there are some bargaining councils that compel labour 
brokers to adhere to the minimum conditions of service that are contained in collective 
agreements.  See, for example, Clause 20(11)(d) of the main agreement concluded at the Metal 
and Engineering Industries Bargaining Council, published in GN R 898 in GG 32555 of 11 
September 2009. 
26  NEDLAC (n 5) Annexures A, B, C and D. 
27  1996 (hereafter Constitution). 
28  S 39(1) of the Constitution states that: 
When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum – 
(a) […] 
(b) must consider international law; and 
(c) may consider foreign law. 
South African National Defence Union v Minister of Defence 1999 ILJ 2265 (CC) and National 
Union of Mineworkers of South Africa v Bader Bop (Pty) Ltd 2003 BLLR 103 (CC) serve as 
examples where ILO principles were followed.  
29  Hansard of Namibia 22–23, 25 and 30, as referred to in Africa Personnel Services para 7.  The 
debate was preceded by LaRRI www.larri.com.na.  The main findings of this report suggested 
that although the provisions of Namibian labour law apply to labour hire companies as well, the 
practice of employment at will is applied by labour brokers; labour hire is hardly a springboard for 
permanent jobs; and the most significant problems experienced by labour hire workers are the 
lack of benefits and job security and low wages.  The LaRRI report concluded with the 
recommendation that the labour hire system be abolished in Namibia. 
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remains a politically charged issue.30 Arguments in favour of the regulation of labour 
broking, as opposed to its abolition, were countered in the Namibian Parliament by 
the view that it would be similar to regulatory attempts made by the opponents to the 
abolitionists' struggle against slavery. It was said that slavery could not be regulated 
in an attempt to give it a humane character. 
 
The outcome of the debate resulted in a withdrawal of the initial proposal that sought 
to regulate labour broking. The amended provision placed an outright ban on the 
triangular relationship, backed by criminal sanction.  Section 128 of the NLA states: 
 
128. Prohibition of labour hire 
(1) No person may, for reward, employ any person with a view to 
making that person available to a third party to perform work for 
the third party. 
(2) […] 
(3) Any person who contravenes or fails to comply with this section 
commits an offence and is liable on conviction to a fine not 
exceeding N$80,000.00 or to imprisonment for a period not 
exceeding 5 years or to both such fine and imprisonment. 
 
These provisions were implemented against the following background. Namibia is a 
member of the ILO and under the heading "Principles of State Policy", the Namibian 
Constitution provides that the state must adopt policies aimed at "adherence to and 
action in accordance with the international Conventions and Recommendations of 
the ILO".31 Although it is a member, Namibia is not a signatory to the ILO's Private 
Employment Agencies Convention,32 which seeks to provide guidelines in respect of 
labour broking.  
 
Also relevant is that the Namibian Constitution guarantees a number of fundamental 
rights and freedoms.  Included in the list of human rights are the rights to freedom 
from slavery and forced labour,33 equality and freedom from discrimination,34 
freedom of association35 and, significantly for purpose of this discussion, all persons' 
                                                 
30  Africa Personnel Services para 7–8. 
31  Art 95(d) Namibian Constitution. 
32  181 of 1997 (hereafter ILO's Agencies Convention). 
33  Art 9 Namibian Constitution. 
34  Art 10 Namibian Constitution. 
35  Art 21(e) Namibian Constitution. 
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right to "practise any profession, or carry on any occupation, trade or business".36 A 
similar provision is contained in the South African Constitution.37 
 
The NLA's prohibition of labour hire was intended to take effect on 1 March 2009 but 
on 29 February 2009, the Namibian High Court (NHC)38 suspended its 
implementation subject to constitutional review by the SCA.  The facts before the 
NHC in the Africa Personnel Services39 matter were straightforward.  Africa 
Personnel Services (the labour broker) employs approximately 6 085 employees and 
is one of the biggest employers in Namibia. The labour broker brought an application 
challenging the constitutionality of Section 128 of the NLA on the grounds that the 
section infringes on its fundamental freedom to engage in any profession, or carry on 
any occupation, trade or business.  
 
The NHC considered the Roman law origin of the common-law contract of 
employment and held that the equivalent of that time, the locatio conductio 
operarum, entailed "the letting and hiring of personal services in return for monetary 
return".40 One of the other forms of hiring (that is no longer valid today) was slavery, 
where the owner of the slave could in terms of the locatio conductio rei rent out the 
object (namely, the slave). It was held that the common-law contract of employment 
had only two parties to it and that there was no room for interposing a third party, the 
labour broker, into this relationship.41 To this, the NHC added that labour broking 
was akin to slavery and it should be eradicated.42 The NHC held that since Section 
128 of the NLA also rendered labour hire illegal, the broker could not claim a right to 
conduct such business under the fundamental freedom of occupation, profession, 
trade or business.  Despite finding in favour of the binding effect of Section 128, the 
NHC did, however, in the interim grant an urgent interdict suspending the 
                                                 
36  Art 21(j) Namibian Constitution. 
37  S 22 of the South African Constitution provides that "every citizen has the right to choose their 
trade, occupation or profession freely". 
38 Case number A13/2009.  
39 Case number A4/2008. See the brief discussion of the case by Horn and Kangueehi 2009 
Namibia Law Journal 101. 
40  Africa Personnel Services para 20. 
41  Africa Personnel Services para 20–21. 
42  The HC relied on the ILO's Declaration of Philadelphia (1944), which confirms that labour is not a 
commodity. See Horn and Kangueehi (n 38) 103 in this regard. 
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implementation of the section until the SCA had the opportunity to provide finality 
regarding the question at hand.43 
 
The Namibian SCA considered and upheld the appeal and consequently struck 
Section 128 of the NLA off the statute book.44 A unanimous bench noted that the 
respondents in the matter had never raised the argument in the court a quo about 
the allowing of a third party into the employment relationship. Africa Personnel 
Services had not been given the opportunity to argue this contentious argument 
before the NHC reached its decision.  To this, the SCA added that significant 
changes have occurred in the way in which work is done in the contemporary 
globalised economy. It held that if:  
 
contracts of service [had] remained marooned in Roman or common law of 
pre-modern times, the narrow scope of their application would have been 
entirely inappropriate to address the demands of the modern era.45 
 
On the issue of legality, the SCA held that the mere fact that the NLA declared 
labour brokers illegal placed limits neither on the ambit of the rights and freedoms 
contained in the Constitution, nor on the authority of the SCA to consider the 
constitutionality of legislative provisions that established possible infringements on 
constitutional rights.  The SCA held that: 
 
statutory, customary or common law restrictions that fall outside the ambit of 
permissible limitations under Sub-Article (2) are unconstitutional.  
Impermissible restrictions contained in legislation cannot be considered as 
'legislation lawfully enacted' … If the limitation of a fundamental freedom by 
'the law of Namibia' is unconstitutional, the scope of the fundamental 
freedom is not circumscribed by it. To hold otherwise would be to put the 
proverbial cart before the horse.46 
 
It was argued on behalf of the Government of Namibia that the fundamental freedom 
protected by Article 21(1)(j) of its Constitution is linked to human dignity and that this 
value can only vest in a natural person and not in juristic persons.  The SCA rejected 
this argument, pointing to the fact that the phrase applied to "all persons" and that 
                                                 
43  Case number A13/2009. 
44  Africa Personnel Services. 
45  Africa Personnel Services para 23. 
46  Africa Personnel Services par 51. 
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this might refer to both natural and juristic persons.  The court continued that it was 
essential that a generous and purposive interpretation be followed.47 The SCA held 
that even though labour broking might be associated with the abhorrent history of 
labour hire of the past the Constitution served as a compass for current and future 
developments of the law. The SCA recognised that the freedom of trade and 
occupation is essential to the social, economic and political welfare of society as a 
whole.  This is applicable not only to individuals, but also to those who organise 
themselves into collectives such as partnerships and companies. 
 
Despite the fact that Namibia has not ratified the ILO's Agencies Convention, the 
SCA took cognisance of the content of these international guidelines and I deem it 
necessary to consider them in more detail. The ILO's Agencies Convention 
recognises labour brokers as a "labour market service" and in Article 2(3) states that:  
 
[o]ne purpose of [the] Convention is to allow the operation of private 
employment agencies as well as the protection of workers using their 
services, within the framework of its provisions.  
 
Article 3 provides for the conditions governing their operation in accordance with 
prescriptions regarding registration and licensing before according them legal status. 
Article 4 requires measures to be taken to ensure that employees who are placed by 
labour brokers are not denied the right to freedom of association and the right to 
collective bargaining, while Article 11 requires that members take measures to 
ensure that employees employed by labour brokers are given adequate protection in 
relation to minimum wages, working time, social security benefits, occupational 
safety and health compensation in case of insolvency and maternity protection.  One 
aspect that is patently clear is that the ILO's Agencies Convention does not seek to 
ban labour broking, but the aim is to recognise the existence of labour brokers and to 
regulate this economic activity to ensure that workers so placed are not exploited. 
 
What remained for the SCA was to consider whether the restriction imposed by 
Section 128 was reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society.  The 
SCA accepted that under the limitation clause, the otherwise generous application 
                                                 
47  Africa Personnel Services par 36–37. 
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and free exercise of fundamental freedoms might be circumscribed. As such, it 
constituted an exception to the norm and was, therefore, to be construed strictly.  
The SCA accepted that: 
 
anyone who seeks to justify the limitation of a fundamental freedom by law 
bears the burden to show that the justification falls clearly and 
unambiguously within the terms of permissible constitutional limitations, 
interpreted objectively and as narrowly as the Constitution's exact words will 
allow.48 
 
This limitation, the SCA held, went beyond the permissible limitations of the rights 
and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution and Section 128 of the NLA was held 
to be unconstitutional.  The effect of this decision is that Section 128 of the NLA has 
been nullified and the prohibition against labour brokers in Namibia has been lifted in 
its entirety.  For the time being labour brokers are at liberty to continue with their 
activities in an unhindered fashion without any particular regulations applying to their 
trade.  
 
I submit that the SCA was correct in its decision. The court followed the international 
standard that does not place an outright ban on labour broking. Although Namibia 
has its own particular history in respect of labour hire, it cannot escape the fact that it 
is a member of the global market place.  The SCA in my view also interpreted the 
Constitution correctly by protecting the right to free economic activity. The court 
recognised that the only method of protecting workers placed by labour brokers is 
not limited to the complete banning of labour broking.  The option of the protection of 
workers through the regulation of the labour broking industry remains viable.  What 
the SCA had in effect done, was to endeavour to strike a balance between the right 
to freedom of economic activity and the protection of workers' rights. 
 
That the SCA has lifted the ban on labour hire, does not mean that this unregulated 
situation will prevail.  The Namibian Government has shown a strong resolve to 
protect the working conditions of workers who are placed by labour brokers.  Barely 
three months after the handing down of the SCA decision the Namibian press 
reported that the Labour Commissioner had indicated that new labour hire 
                                                 
48  Africa Personnel Services par 65. 
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regulations were near completion.49 According to one report, the regulations would 
enforce equal pay and benefits for labour hire employees and permanent employees 
and such employees would be entitled to written contracts of employment signed by 
both the labour broker and the client.50 
 
Although it can be said that it amounts to nothing more than speculation at this 
stage,  there is in my view a strong possibility that the debate about labour broking in 
South Africa may be strongly influenced by the developments that are currently 
unfolding in Namibia. 
 
4 Submissions before NEDLAC 
 
As previously mentioned, policymakers in South Africa are in the process of deciding 
upon the extent to which labour brokers should be permitted to function in this 
society.  During the deliberations at NEDLAC, Cosatu and Nactu reiterated their 
stance that labour broking should be banned as it is deemed "immoral and politically 
reprehensible".  It was argued that labour broking "reduces the human dignity of 
workers and their families".51 The trade union federations were also opposed to the 
agenda for this round of discussions being narrowed to the issue of labour brokers 
rather than extending the examination to other vulnerable forms of work such as 
contract work, part-time employees and fixed-term employees.52 
 
As was expected, employer organisations representing labour brokers opposed the 
abolition of labour brokers.  However, what might not have been expected, was their 
balanced stance regarding the real need for the regulation of the industry and that 
they reached a memorandum of understanding with the second largest trade union 
federation, Fedusa, about an agenda regarding the regulation of the labour broking 
industry.53 In their written submission to the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on 
                                                 
49  Heita 2010 New Era 1 reported that on 25 February 2010 the Labour Commissioner Bro-Mathew 
Shinguadja commented that "[a]s we are speaking, we are about to finalise the regulations". 
50  Heita (n 50). 
51  NEDLAC (n 5) 3.  See also Nactu 2009 http://api.ning.com.  Note that Fedusa called for a 
combination of regulation and enforcement of labour broking. 
52  See Fourie 2008 PER 110–184 for a comprehensive discussion of and international perspective 
on the vulnerability of non-standard employees. 
53  Fedusa 2009 www.fedusa.org.za. 
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Labour Broking in August of 2009, the Confederation of Associations in the Private 
Employment Sector (CAPES) pointed out that they accepted the principle of 
vulnerability of employees placed by labour brokers and that they embraced the ILO 
notion of "decent work".54  
 
CAPES confirmed that labour brokers place more than 500 000 temporary assignees 
per day across all industries, 32% of which are appointed permanently each year.55  
Labour brokers also facilitate more than 20 000 learnerships per annum.  CAPES 
argued: regulations that complied with ILO conventions must be implemented; a co-
regulatory body should be established with the Department of Labour, trade unions 
and employer organisations as the constituting parties; labour brokers should be 
bound by bargaining council agreements in cases in which they are applicable; and 
proper enforcement and deregistration of non-complying labour brokers should take 
place through this co-regulatory body.  During the deliberations at NEDLAC, 
organised business also mentioned that they were not completely averse to the idea 
of joint and several liability of labour brokers and their clients, but that this should be 
limited to vulnerable employees.56 
 
The position adopted by government at NEDLAC has shifted somewhat from the 
Minister of Labour's original point of view regarding the abolition of labour broking.57 
Government now suggests that the focus should fall on strict regulation rather than 
on outright prohibition. Amongst others, government proposes that all labour brokers 
should be required to register (subject to minimum requirements) and that any 
contract between an unregistered labour broker and a client would be invalid.58 The 
suggestion continues that, after consultations with the Employment Conditions 
Commission, the Minister of Labour should be given the regulatory power to prohibit 
labour broking in specific sectors and to establish a joint governing structure for the 
industry. Government also supports the principle that labour brokers and clients 
should be jointly and severally liable for all contractual and legislative obligations. 
This would include disputes about unfair dismissal and unfair labour practices. In 
                                                 
54  Monage 2009 www.capes.org.za. 
55  Monage (n 55) 2. 
56  NEDLAC (n 5) 64 Annexure E. 
57  Majavu 2008 The Sowetan 8. 
58  NEDLAC (n 5) 6–8 Annexure A. 
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addition, employees who are placed by labour brokers should remain employees of 
such brokers during periods when they are not placed with a client and there should 
be written contracts of employment between the labour broker and all its workers.  
 
Government suggests that employees placed by labour brokers should fall under 
general labour legislation that prescribes a six-month period of probation during 
which employees will not be protected against unfair dismissal provisions. It is also 
proposed that the EEA be amended to provide effective remedies in respect of 
unjustified discrimination in terms of conditions of service and wages between 
permanent workers and those placed by a labour broker.  And, finally, workers who 
are placed by labour brokers should be protected to enable them to gain 
organisational rights and to engage in collective bargaining with both the labour 
broker and the client. 
 
5 Conclusion 
 
A number of similarities and differences between Namibia and South Africa are 
evident. Both countries are members of the ILO; have not adopted the ILO's 
Agencies Convention; and function under a supreme constitution that guarantees the 
right to freedom of occupation, trade and profession.  Added to this, both countries 
are grappling with the issue of the manner in which to deal with labour broking and 
are at the point of changing their respective legislative regimes that regulate this 
issue. 
 
The major difference between the two countries is that whereas one of the countries 
has elected to ban labour brokers, the other has until now expressly left room for the 
existence and flourishing of labour broking. The South African courts are not bound 
by decisions of foreign jurisdictions. However, foreign law may be considered59 and, 
owing to the similarities of some of the constitutional principles of the two countries, 
nothing would preclude South African courts from considering what has happened in 
Namibia.  Two issues are pertinent in this regard:  first, there is a strong likelihood 
that should labour broking be prohibited in South Africa, the relevant provisions will 
                                                 
59  S 39 Constitution. 
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also be faced with a constitutional challenge based on the protection of the 
fundamental freedom to trade and occupation;  second, even though both countries 
have not adopted the ILO's Agencies Convention, South African courts will probably 
also be directed (albeit indirectly) by this international institution's guiding 
principles.60 This entails that labour broking be recognised, albeit with strict 
regulation protecting the vulnerable position of workers placed in the triangular 
relationship.  
 
What would the result be in South Africa of a ban (albeit unlikely) on labour brokers 
and a constitutional challenge based on freedom to trade and occupation? I suggest 
that reliance on this right will be pitted against another constitutional right, namely 
"everyone's right to fair labour practice".61 It may be argued, for example, that the 
right to fair labour practices in South Africa trumps the right to economic freedom 
and that the ban on labour broking can therefore be justified.  
 
In my view, there is a strong likelihood that the fundamental right to fair labour 
practices will not prevail against the first mentioned right. The reason I say this, is 
that the Constitutional Court has accepted that fairness must be applied to both 
employers and workers.62  The court has accepted the responsibility to tweak the 
scales between employers and workers to establish an appropriate and fair balance. 
In seeking this balance, the courts will undoubtedly be influenced by the Namibian 
court decision and international best practice, which directs that labour brokers 
should be regulated and not banned in the modern world of work. 
 
What legislative reforms are we likely to witness in the near future? I not only submit 
that South African policymakers will be influenced by the Namibian experience and 
prevailing ILO principles, but also predict that Parliament will be persuaded to 
introduce stricter regulation of labour broking. This will see the inclusion of 
requirements on the registration of labour brokers; joint and several liability for the 
labour broker and the client; the prohibition against discrimination associated with 
                                                 
60  The Constitution states that when interpreting the Bill of Rights international law must be 
considered (n 28). 
61  S 23(1) Constitution. 
62  National Education Health and Allied Workers Union v University of Cape Town 2003 ILJ 95 (CC) 
para 39. 
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different wages and conditions of service for full-time employees and those placed 
by labour brokers; and improvements regarding collective bargaining rights for labour 
brokers' workers.  However, it is doubtful whether the suggested inclusion of a 
probationary period of six months during which workers will not be protected by 
unfair dismissal provisions will be included in the amendments.  The South African 
Constitution entrenches "everyone's" right to fair labour practices,63 which will make 
it difficult to justify why workers with a short service record should be exempt from 
protection offered against unfair dismissal.64 It is also suggested that strong 
opposition will be staged against such an amendment by organised labour and that 
government will have more to lose than to gain by including it in future amendments. 
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